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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
The last two decades have witnessed a substantial 
amount of research designed to investigate psychological 
aspects of depression; in particular, the role of cognitive 
factors has been a prominent focus (Gotlib & McCabe, 1992). 
Gotlib and McCabe (1992) claim that this increased interest 
in cognitive aspects of depression is due mainly to Beck's 
theory of depression. Beck's model focuses on three aspects 
of cognition commonly observed in depressed persons: the 
"cognitive triad," cognitive distortions or faulty 
information processing, and negative self-schemata (Beck, 
1967 I 1976) • 
The cognitive triad refers to the idea that depressed 
individuals regard themselves, their futurer and their 
experiences in an idiosyncratic, negative manner (Beck, 
1983). They view themselves as defective, inadequate, or 
deprived, often attributing unpleasant experiences to a 
psychological, moral, or physical defect in themselves. 
Also, depressed individuals exhibit a negative view of the 
future, expecting their current difficulties to continue 
indefinitely (Beck, 1983). They anticipate hardship and 
frustration, and they predict failure in future tasks. In 
addition, depressed persons have a tendency to interpret 
their experiences in a negative way, viewing the world as 
making excessive demands and preventing them from reaching 
their life goals (Beck, 1983). 
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According to Beck (1976), the second aspect of 
cognition in depressed persons involves faulty information 
processing, or cognitive distortions. Depressed individuals 
tend to draw negative conclusions about situations, to focus 
on negative aspects of situations, and to exaggerate the 
significance of negative experiences. Finally, the third 
aspect postulated by Beck (1976) states that depressed 
persons exhibit negative schemas. Schemas are cognitive 
structures that consist of a person's fundamental beliefs 
and assumptions (Beck & Weishaar, 1989). Depressive schemas 
are theorized to be rigid, consisting of inappropriate 
beliefs or attitudes about the individual and the world, and 
they often constitute perfectionistic standards by which the 
individual judges him- or herself (Gotlib & McCabe, 1992) 
These schematic beliefs can be latent, or outside of 
conscious awareness, and they tend to be activated by 
stressful environmental events. Furthermore, according to 
Beck, people who have negative schemas are more likely to 
get depressed. Thus, the affective, behavioral, and 
physiological symptoms of depression are considered to be 
consequences of schema-based negative information processing 
(Gotlib & McCabe, 1992) . In sum, particular ways of 
processing information are theorized to cause depression. 
Encoding Biases 
Perception involves interpreting environmental stimuli 
using existing knowledge structures (often described as 
schemas) . Human perceptual processes depend to a large 
extent on learned, inferential encoding 11 rules" that impose 
preexisting categories in order to interpret newly 
encountered stimuli (Lewicki, Hill, & Sasaki, 1989) 
Because stimuli frequently do not match the categories very 
well, the role of preexisting categories or schemas may 
become particularly important. Perception depends not only 
on the objective characteristics of the stimulus, but also 
on the preexisting encoding rules or categories that the 
perceiver uses to translate the stimulus into subjectively 
meaningful terms. These encoding processes have been 
demonstrated in several studies using different stimulus 
materials, including pattern recognition (e.g., Posner, 
Goldsmith, & Welton, 1967) and person perception (e.g., 
Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982). More recently, several 
studies have focused on the nonconscious acguisition of 
information from the environment and its influence on 
ensuing encoding processes (Lewicki, 1986a, 1986b; Lewicki, 
Hill, & Bizot, 1988). 
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Lewicki (1986b), for example, exposed participants to 
slides of young women's faces paired with brief descriptions 
of their personality. The women differed in the length of 
their hair (short vs. long), while the personality 
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descriptions either focused on the women's kindness or 
capability. There were two covariation conditions: Long-
haired women were described as kind while short-haired ones 
as capable (condition I), or long-haired women were 
identified as capable while short-haired ones as kind 
(condition II). Participants were exposed to either 
condition during the learning phase of the study, and were 
later asked about the kindness and capability of a different 
set of stimulus persons. 
Lewicki (1986b) hypothesized that, if the information 
about the covariation was processed and registered during 
the learning phase, this would result in an increase of 
processing time for subsequent judgments containing 
information relevant to the covariation (e.g., being asked 
about the kindness of a long-haired woman in condition I). 
This hypothesis is based on the reasoning that, when 
individuals find and retrieve relevant information from 
memory in trying to make judgments, the examination of that 
information will increase response time (Glucksber & 
Mccloskey, 1981; cited in Lewicki, l986b). The results 
obtained conformed to this prediction. Although individuals 
were unable to articulate the correct covariation between 
the women's visual and personality characteristics when 
interviewed after the task, they seemed to ~learn~ about 
this co-occurrence and to use this knowledge in subsequent 
judgments. This learning was demonstrated in their 
"correct" judgments of long-hair and short-hair women in 
terms of kindness and capability ratings. 
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As a result of this inferential process at encoding, 
the final representation of a stimulus that is encoded and 
stored in memory consists of both ~objective~ features of 
the stimulus (i.e., characteristics actually present in the 
external world and directly perceived by the individual) and 
"subjective" features (i.e., characteristics not present or 
not directly perceivable but inferred by the individual 
using the inferential category) (Lewicki et al., 1989). 
Thus, from the example above, long hair would be considered 
part of the objective stimulus, and the inference about 
kindness or capability would be a subjective feature based 
on the encoding process. Furthermore, the human memory 
system does not seem to distinguish inf erred characteristics 
from directly perceived ones (Hill, Lewicki, Czyzewska, & 
Boss, 1989; Hill, Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Schuller, 1990; 
Lewicki et al., 1989). As Hill, Lewicki, and Neubauer 
(1991) note, an important implication of this phenomenon is 
that inferential rules that control the encoding processes 
can "fabricate'' self-supportive evidence. Because the 
encoding rules develop and become stronger as a function of 
the amount of stimuli interpreted as consistent with the 
rules (Lewicki et al., 1988), the lack of differentiation 
between actually perceived and inferred elements implies 
that encoding rules may gradually develop in a self-
perpetuating manner (Lewicki et al., 1989). Thus, for 
example, long-haired women may be perceived as kind despite 
objective, stimulus-bound evidence for this judgment. 
Lewicki et al. (1989) describe this occurrence as an 
encoding "bias." 
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Studies of encoding biases. Hill et al. (1989) 
investigated the process of encoding biases with different 
stimulus materials, including matrices of digits and 
silhouettes of persons. Results indicated that participants 
nonconsciously acquired an encoding bias during the learning 
phase of the experiment, which increased in strength during 
the testing phase as they made judgments for ambiguous 
material (i.e., stimuli that were neither consistent nor 
inconsistent with the covariation) . Lewicki and his 
colleagues (1989) examined this self-perpetuating process by 
exposing participants to computer-generated brain diagrams, 
in which the percentage of a particular character making up 
the diagram covaried, in a nonconsciously-salient manner, 
with a verbal description of the person. Specifically, 
brain diagrams contained either 13~ or 17% of ASCII 
character 178. During the learning phase of the study, 
these diagrams were explicitly identified as intelligent or 
not intelligent (i.e., 13% brain diagrams were identified as 
intelligent and 17% diagrams as not intelligent for one half 
of the participants, while the opposite covariation was true 
for the remaining participants). During the testing phase, 
participants saw additional diagrams with no explicit 
description and were asked to rate the intelligence of the 
individuals to whom the brain scans belonged. Lewicki et 
al. (1989) found that participants rated "intelligent brain 
scans" increasingly as more intelligent and ~nonintelligent 
brains scans" increasingly as less intelligent, despite 
participants' inability to articulate the nature of the 
covariation. These results suggest that participants 
acquired the new encoding bias and that this bias became 
stronger as they rated ambiguous material. 
In addition, research findings indicate that the 
encoding rules that develop through the self-perpetuation 
process can be independent of or even inconsistent with the 
individual's knowledge that can be articulated. For 
example, Hill, Lewicki, and Neubauer (1991) interviewed 
participants after the study and found that, despite the 
accuracy of their ratings, participants were unable to 
describe the actual covariation manipulated in the learning 
phase, or gave incorrect reasons (e.g., ~overall shape 11 of 
the brain scan) for their ratings. 
7 
The process of self-perpetuating encoding suggests 
important implications for mental illness. Specifically, 
this process may contribute to the development of erroneous 
and irrational interpretive biases such as those observed in 
depression and other mental disorders (Bill et al., 1991). 
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Encoding Biases and Depression 
Beck (1967) proposed that depressed individuals seem to 
show an unconscious negative perceptual bias that leads to 
an overall pessimistic view of themselves, their 
experiences, and the future. Depressives are frequently 
regarded as perceiving themselves and their environment in a 
negative fashion. Studies have consistently demonstrated 
that depressed individuals exhibit pessimistic and hopeless 
beliefs, and that they show a general negative bias in their 
attributions about events (e.g., Abramson, Metalsky, & 
Alloy, 1989; Alloy & Ahrens, 1987; Riskind, Rholes, Brannon, 
& Burdick, 1987). Given the findings of these studies, Hill 
et al. (1991) concluded that negative encoding rules appear 
to be generally more accessible in individuals with 
depressive symptoms (i.e., these individuals exhibit a 
readiness to perceive information in a negatively biased 
manner) . 
Although the existence of a general negative bias and 
its association with depression is wiaely accepted, little 
is known about the cognitive origins of these negative 
biases and why they gradually develop into pervasive 
features of the way in which a depressed person interprets 
reality (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). According to 
Hill et al. (1991), self-perpetuation processes may provide 
a partial answer to this question. During the early stages 
of depression, even a slight increase in the readiness to 
use negative interpretive rules (e.g., ~nothing will ever 
work out for me") may drive the individual to encode 
ambiguous stimuli as more negative than they actually are. 
Thus, this increased accessibility of negative encoding 
categories may prompt depressed individuals to show a 
stronger tendency to self-perpetuate encoding biases 
involving negative information. 
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Indeed, Hill et al. (1991) found evidence for the 
possibility of such a mechanism within depression. They 
exposed depressed and nondepressed participants to a series 
of face diagrams containing a nonconsciously-salient 
covariation between a facial feature and either a negative 
or positive personality characteristic accompanying each 
diagram. Specifically, the location of the nostrils in the 
face diagrams covaried with an accompanying personality 
characteristic describing life satisfaction (i.e., 
"generally satisfied" or "generally unsatisfied~). Thus, in 
one experimental condition, low nostril faces were always 
described as satisfied and high nostril faces as 
unsatisfied; in the other experimental condition, low 
nostril faces were always described as unsatisfied and high 
nostril faces as satisfied. After this learning phase, 
participants rated the degree of satisfaction of 80 new face 
diagrams which did not contain any information supportive of 
the covariation. That is, personality information was not 
provided during the testing phase. Hill et al. (1991) 
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expected that depressed participants would exhibit the self-
perpetuating process, particularly for "unsatisfied" 
covariations (i.e., when rating faces that were expected to 
be classified as unsatisfied according to the respective 
encoding rule) , due to the increased accessibility of the 
negative personality feature (i.e., dissatisfaction with 
life) in depressed individuals. 
As Hill et al. (1991) predicted, depressed participants 
learned the new encoding rule, "correctly'' perceiving the 
height of the nostrils in the face diagrams in terms of life 
satisfaction. This pattern was especially observed for the 
"unsatisfied personality records.~ Also as predicted, the 
influence of the newly-learned encoding rule on 
participants' judgments increased over time. Their ratings 
during the second half of the testing phase (i.e., the last 
40 trials) were more consistent with the covariation 
acquired in the learning phase than the ratings during the 
first half. In addition, participants could not articulate 
consciously what the covariation was despite their accurate 
performance. 
In summary, negative encoding rules may self-perpetuate 
in depressed individuals, contributing to the development of 
unconscious negative perceptual biases. 
Personality Characteristics as Predispositions to Depression 
Recent research in depression underscores a growing 
convergence of opinion among theorists from different 
theoretical orientations regarding the association between 
dependent or achievement personality traits and depression 
(Arieti & Bemporad, 1980; Beck, 1983; Hammen, Ellicott, & 
Gitlin, 1989). According to Beck (1983), the dependent 
(also known as aff iliative or sociotropic) type appears to 
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be more sensitive to social rejection, while the achievement 
(also known as self-critical or autonomous) type seems to be 
more sensitive to failure scenarios. Persons with 
dependency concerns usually need others for safety, 
gratification, and support. In addition, they tend to fear 
social isolation, and they often seek reassurance from 
others (Beck, 1983). In comparison, persons with 
achievement concerns tend to have their own internalized 
standards for accomplishment, which are often higher than 
the conventionally accepted norms. Furthermore, such 
persons tend to judge their own worth by their ability to 
successfully fulfill specific expectations (Beck, 1983). 
The association between personality style and vulnerability 
to specific stressors is known as the congruency effect 
(Segal, Shaw, Vella, & Katz, 1992). According to this 
hypothesis, a high degree of dependency concerns increases 
the risk for a depressive reaction to a negative 
interpersonal event (e.g., conflict, rejection) but not to a 
negative achievement event (e.g., work or school problems) 
Additionally, a high degree of achievement concerns is 
proposed to present the opposite pattern of risk (Robins, 
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Hayes, Block, Kramer, & Villena, 1995). 
Studies of personality dimensions-event congruence have 
yielded mixed results. Some researchers have found support 
for the congruency hypothesis for both the dependent and 
achievement vulnerabilities (e.g., Hammen, Marks, Mayol, & 
deMayo, 1985; Segal et al., 1992). However, other studies 
have found evidence only for one of the hypothesized 
personality vulnerability factors. For example, Clark, 
Beck, and Brown (1992) found support only for dependency 
vulnerability, while Hammen et al. (1989) found evidence for 
the achievement vulnerability but for not the dependent one. 
Although a variety of samples have been used (e.g., clinical 
or nonclinical samples, cross-sectional or prospective 
design), Robins et al. (1995) claim that the differences in 
findings do not seem to be systematically related to these 
characteristics. Finally, although researchers have 
investigated the role of self-perpetuating encoding biases 
among depressed individuals, no such studies have 
additionally examined the congruency effect. The present 
study intends to examine vulnerability to specific 
stressors, which, in turn, is hypothesized to increase the 
risk of a depressive reaction. 
The Present Study 
In view of the above-mentioned considerations, the 
present experiment examines whether individuals with 
achievement and dependent personality characteristics differ 
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in their ability to make judgments based on a newly acquired 
encoding rule. This experiment utilizes the stimulus 
materials (i.e., computerized brain diagrams) used by 
Lewicki et al. (1989), for purposes of partial replication. 
The study consists of a learning and a testing phase. 
During the learning phase, participants were exposed to a 
nonconsciously-salient covariation between an evaluatively 
neutral feature of the brain diagram (i.e., a particular 
ASCII character) and a particular situation with a negative 
endpoint (e.g., having very few frienas or a low grade point 
average, GPA) or a positive endpoint (e.g., having many 
friends or high GPA) . During the testing phase of the 
experiment, participants were exposed to aclditional brain 
diagrams with no covariation information and were asked to 
make judgments for the stimuli (i.e., to judge whether the 
brain diagram was indicative of someone with few or many 
friends, or someone with a low or high GPA) . 
Participants are expected to learn the encoding rule 
presented in the learning phase of the stuay. Based on the 
self-perpetuation hypothesis, their judgments <luring the 
testing phase are expected to become gradually more 
consistent with the covariation learned in the first phase. 
Specifically, participants are expected to "correctly" 
perceive the brain diagrams according to number of friends 
or GPA, and this effect is hypothesized to be more 
pronounced during the second half of the testing phase 
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(i.e., the second segment of trials). 
In addition, participants were classified into one of 
the four following personality styles: dependent, 
achievement (self-critical), dependent and achievement, or 
neither dependent nor achievement. The two types of 
situations chosen for this study, number of friends and GPA 
level, are presumed to represent interpersonal and 
achievement concerns, respectively. Based on the congruency 
hypothesis, an interaction effect is predicted between the 
four levels of personality subtypes and the situation to be 
rated (friends or GPA). That is, participants' judgments 
are expected to differ depending on the match between their 
personality subtype and the covariation condition involving 
interpersonal or achievement concerns. For example, the 
ratings of ambiguous material by a dependent individual (an 
individual more sensitive to social rejection) are predicted 
to be more consistent with the previously learned 
covariation when the encoding rule involves rating number of 
friends rather than GPA level. 
These predictions would support a vulnerability model 
based on personality characteristics, which implies that 
negative encoding biases occur independently of mood (i.e., 
encoding biases precede depressed mood) . An alternative 
model is that negative encoding biases do not precede 
depression, but are a consequence of depressive symptoms 
(i.e., a mood-dependent processing style). Jn order to test 
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this alternative, state-dependent model, encoding biases 
were examined as a function of whether participants were 
depressed or nondepressed (irrespective of personality 
style). That is, only depressed participants would be 
expected to exhibit negative encoding biases, independent of 
achievement or interpersonal concerns. Specifically, 
depressed individuals are predicted to be more accurate in 
their ratings when covariations involve negative content 
(very few friends, low GPA), while nondepressed individuals 
are expected to be more accurate in their ratings when the 
covariations involve positive content (many friends, high 
GPA) 
Given that Beck (1976) proposed that faulty information 
processing observed in depressed individuals is automatic 
(i.e., occurs nonconsciously), a strong test of his theory 
involves the examination of encoding biases at a 
nonconscious level. Such a test is attempted in this study. 
However, because the nonconscious effects found by Lewicki 
et al. (1989) were small (although statistically 
significant), it was questionable whether the present study 
would replicate their results. Thus, a weaker test of 
Beck's theory and the congruency effect would examine 
participants' conscious processing of the covariation 
information. That is, in addition to examining nonconscious 
information processing, participants' conscious recognition 
of covariations are also examined. Based on the congruency 
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hypothesis, it is predicted that dependent participants 
would be more likely to recognize consciously covariations 
involving number of friends, whereas achievement-oriented 
participants would be more likely to recognize consciously 
covariations involving GPA. Furthermore, to the extent that 
information-processing is state-dependent (i.e., during 
depression) and not a function of personality vulnerability, 
it is predicted that depressed individuals would be more 
likely to recognize consciously covariations involving 
negative content (few friends, low GPA). In contrast, 
nondepressed individuals are predicted to recognize 
consciously covariations involving positive content (many 




One hundred and sixty-one undergraduate students from 
psychology classes at Loyola University of Chicago 
participated in the study. Fifteen participants were 
dropped from the final sample due to their errors in 
following the experimental procedure. For example, some 
participants inverted the rating scale (i.e., using the 
lower half of the scale for ratings that required numbers 
from the upper half of the scale), while others gave random 
ratings during the learning phase against specific 
instructions to use either the lower or upper halves of the 
rating scale depending on the type of brain diagram to be 
rated. Thus, the final sample consisted of 146 
participants, 90 females and 56 males. 
Measures 
Participants were asked to complete the Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale, Form A (DAS-A) , a widely used measure of 
beliefs underlying self-worth (Weissman & Beck, 1978; cited 
in Beck, Brown, Steer, & Weissman, 1991), in order to 
categorize individuals as having strong dependent or 
achievement vulnerabilities. The original DAS contains 100 
17 
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self-report items. Abbreviated parallel 40-item forms, DAS-
A and DAS-B, have been developed using factor analysis. 
Alternate-form reliability has been found to range between 
.79 and .92 (Nelson, Stern, & Cicchetti, 1992; Oliver & 
Baumgart, 1985). In order to evaluate the ability of the 
DAS-A to identify personality subtypes with hypothesized 
vulnerabilities to depression, Cane, Olinger, Gotlib, and 
Kuiper (1986) investigated the factor structure of the 
measure with respect to the achievement and socially-
dependent subtypes. Using a sample of 664 university 
students, they found that two major factors, performance 
evaluation and approval by others, accounted for a large 
proportion of the variance (61%) in the DAS scores. As the 
authors noted, the events hypothesized to precipitate 
depression for the socially-dependent and self-critical 
subtypes (disruption of personal relationships and failure 
to meet personal goals and standards, respectively) are 
similar to these two factors (Cane et al., 1986). In 
addition, validation studies have found the test-retest 
reliability of the total DAS to range between .73 and .84, 
while internal consistency measures (i.e., coefficient 
alphas) have ranged from .89 to .96 (Nelson et al., 1992; 
Oliver & Baumgart, 1985; Weissman, 1979}. Form A 
coefficient alphas have been found to range between .85 and 
.94 (Cane et al., 1986; Nelson et al., 1992; Oliver & 
Baumgart, 1985). Evidence for the discriminant validity of 
the measure has been shown in the test's ability to 
distinguish reliably between groups of depressed and 
clinical control participants (Nelson et al., 1992). 
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Two additional measures, the Achievement Beliefs Scale 
(ABS) and the Dependency Beliefs Scale (DBS), were used to 
determine participants' achievement and dependency beliefs 
(Persons, Burns, Perloff, & Miranda, 1993) . Thus, a dual 
criterion, based on the DAS, DBS, and ABS measures was used 
to classify participants' personality subtypes. Regarding 
the validity of the ABS and DBS, Persons et al. (1993) 
examined the relationship between these scales and the 
Personality Style Inventory (PSI) developed by Robins, Ladd, 
Welkowitz, Blaney, Diaz, and Kutcher (1992; cited in Persons 
et al., 1993). They found the DBS to be significantly 
correlated Cx = .61, Q < .01) with the PSI Sociotropy scale 
and nonsignificantly correlated (~ = .25, ns) with the PSI 
Autonomy scale. In addition, they found the ABS to be 
correlated with the PSI Autonomy scale (~ = .57, £ < .01) 
However, the ABS was also correlated with the Sociotropy 
scale of the PSI. Persons et al. (1993) pointed out, as a 
possible explanation for this occurrence, that the 
Sociotropy and Autonomy scales of the PSI overlap 
considerably Cx = .62), while the overlap between the 
Achievement Beliefs Scale and the Dependency Belief Scale 
has been found to range between K= .20 and~= .34. In the 
present study, measures were completed after the 
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experimental task to prevent priming effects. 
In order to classify individuals as depressed or 
nondepressed, participants completed the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1967) following the experimental task. 
This measure was selected because it has shown acceptable 
levels of reliability and validity. Test-retest reliability 
for the BDI has been found to range in the .70s (Steer, 
Beck, & Garrison, 1986) . A meta-analysis performed by Beck, 
Steer, and Garbin (1988) found the internal consistency of 
the measure to range between .81 and .86. Jn addition, the 
construct and concurrent validities appear to be high (Beck 
et al., 1988). The mean correlations of the BDJ with 
clinical ratings and the Hamilton Psychiatric Rating Scale 
for Depression (HRSD) were found to be .72 and .73, 
respectively, for psychiatric patients, and .60 and .74, 
respectively, with nonpsychiatric participants (Beck et al., 
1988) . In the present study, participants who scored 14 or 
above on the BDI were assigned to the depressed group (N 
24) and participants who scored less than 10 were classified 
as not depressed (N = 101), following Beck et al.'s (1988) 
criteria for classifying at least moderate depression. 
Design 
In order to investigate the self-perpetuation 
hypothesis and the congruency effect, the study consisted of 
a 4 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design: 4 levels of 
personality subtypes (achievement, dependent, achievement 
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and dependent, and neither achievement nor dependent); 2 
situations related to achievement or dependency (GPA and 
number of friends, respectively); 2 segments of trials 
during the testing phase (trials 1-40 and trials 41-80); 2 
directions of covariation (between the neutral feature of 
the stimulus and the situation; to be described below); 2 
types of ratings (to be described below) . Because 
participants were randomly assigned to conditions combining 
type of situation ratings and direction of covariation, 
equal numbers (at least 10) of participants within each 
personality subtype were expected in each cell of the 
factorial combination. 
Procedure and Materials 
As previously stated, the present study employed some 
aspects of the stimulus material chosen by Lewicki et al. 
(1989) for the purpose of partial replication. However, 
given the nonsignificant results of our pilot study on a 
sample of 160 participants using the parameters that Lewicki 
and colleagues previously employed, some modifications were 
made (to be explained below) . 
Participants were instructed that the study was 
concerned with how people form intuitive impressions of 
digitized brain diagrams (see learning phase instructions in 
Appendix A) . The brain diagrams were computer-generated, 
high-resolution graphics presented on a computer screen. 
These were made up of eight types of ASCIJ characters (see 
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Appendix B) . The percentages of the different characters 
making up the diagrams varied as follows: The character 
chosen as the ''critical" one (ASCII code 178) was 
manipulated according to two specific percentage levels (17% 
or 4% of the brain scan) , while the percentages of the 
remaining characters were allowed to vary randomly in order 
to complete each diagram. Thus, the two fixed percentages 
of the critical character constituted two types of brain 
diagrams. The percentages among the remaining characters, 
although allowed to vary randomly, were held within limits 
in order to preserve the general shape and appearance of the 
diagrams. 
Lewicki et al. (1989) determined that the difference 
between the two types of brain scans was barely noticeable 
and not salient when these contained 17~ and 13% of the 
critical character, respectively. That is 1 even when 
participants were specifically instructed to focus on the 
critical character, they had difficulty in correctly 
classifying the two types of brains. However, Lewicki et 
al. (1989) did report that participants nonconsciously were 
able to differentiate the brain scans. Nonconscious 
processing was determined by the participants' accurate 
performance in classifying the brain diagrams during the 
testing phase, while being unable to report the basis for 
their classification. Our pilot testing, however, yielded 
nonsignificant results using the 17 and 13 percentages. 
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That is, there was no evidence that participants could 
differentiate the brain scan containing 17% of the critical 
character from the brain scan containing 13% of the critical 
character at a conscious or a nonconscious level. 
Therefore, the difference between the two percentages was 
progressively increased during pilot testing until 
participants found it to be not consciously salient, but at 
least some participants were able to make correct judgments 
nonconsciously. This occurred when the two types of brain 
scans contained 17% and 4% of the critical character, 
respectively. 
Each screen also included numbered x and y axes 
(numbers also randomly generated) along which each diagram 
was presented, providing additional (although meaningless) 
information as a distractor (see Appendix B) . 
The experiment consisted of a practice phase followed 
by a testing phase. Participants in each situation 
condition (GPA or number of friends) were exposed to 36 
computerized brain diagrams during the learning phase. In 
the achievement situation, 18 brain diagrams were explicitly 
identified as "high grade point average (GPA)" and 18 as 
"low grade point average (GPA)." Similarly, participants in 
the dependent situation received 18 brain diagrams 
explicitly identified as [having] "very few friends" and 18 
as [having] "many friends." Thus, all participants received 
information about brain diagrams involving the high endpoint 
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(high GPA, many friends) and the low endpoint (low GPA, very 
few friends) . This repeated measures variable will be 
identified henceforth as the direction of the rating (high, 
low) 
Additional instructions were given to 61 of the 146 
participants in order to provide more meaning regarding the 
situation for GPA or number of friends (see Appendix A). In 
order to compare participants who received additional 
instructions with those who received only the original 
instructions, ~-test analyses were performed for both 
conscious and nonconscious awareness. Results indicate that 
participants did not differ on their ability to become 
consciously or nonconsciously aware of the covariation as a 
result of receiving the additional instructions. 
Although the brain diagrams were generated randomly, 
the screens presented during the learning phase contained a 
systematic, nonconsciously-salient covariation between the 
percentage of the critical character (4% versus 17%) in the 
brain diagram and the explicitly identified situation 
involving GPA or friends. The situation information 
appeared on the upper-right corner of the screen. The 
covariation condition contained two levels. Par half of the 
participants, the higher percentage of the critical 
character (i.e., 17%) was explicitly identified with the 
positive endpoint of the situation (high GPA or many 
friends) , while the lower percentage (4~) was explicitly 
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identified with the negative endpoint of the situation (low 
GPA or very few friends) . The remaining participants were 
randomly assigned to the opposite covariations; the 4% brain 
diagrams were identified with the positive endpoint, and the 
17% brain diagrams with the negative endpoint of the 
personality feature. Thus, the type of brain diagram (4% 
and 17%) was counterbalanced with the situation (positive 
and negative endpoints) in a between-subject design. 
Each record was displayed for 11 s, following the 
protocol of Lewicki et al. (1989). During the practice 
phase, participants were instructed to look at the situation 
information (friends, GPA) and at the brain diagrams 
presented on the computer screen to "get an intuitive feel" 
for each person (see instructions in Appendix A) . As in 
Lewicki et al. (1989), participants also were asked to rate 
each diagram using an 8-point scale (by pressing one of 
eight number keys on the computer keyboard) . The scale was 
divided into 4-point halves and labeled "High GPA" and "Low 
GPA" (or "Many Friends" /"Very Few Friends") at its 
endpoints. Thus, ratings of 1-4 represented a person who 
has very few friends or a low GPA, and ratings of 5-8 
represented a person who has many friends or a high GPA. A 
scale, rather than dichotomous ratings, was used to allow 
participants to express their degree of confidence in their 
judgments. As the type of brain diagram (q~ or l7%) and the 
endpoints of the situation (low GPA/very few friends or high 
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GPA/many friends) were counterbalanced, 4% brains either 
required a low rating (i.e., between 1 and 4 for low GPA or 
very few friends) or a high rating (i.e., between 5 and 8 
for high GPA or many friends) depending on the condition. 
Similarly, 17% brains either required a high or a low rating 
depending on the condition to which participants were 
randomly assigned. 
Even though during the practice phase participants were 
told whether the brain diagram characterizes a person with 
high GPA (many friends) or low GPA (very few friends), they 
were still asked to provide ratings. Participants were told 
that the purpose for making the ratings during the practice 
phase was to familiarize themselves with the rating scale 
and with the task in general. They received no feedback 
concerning the accuracy of their ratings. 
During the testing phase of the experiment, 
participants were exposed to 80 additional brain diagrams 
(40 with 4% of the critical character and 40 with 17% of the 
critical character); however, these diagrams were not 
identified with regard to the level of the particular 
situation (e.g., "high GPA" or "low GPA"). Participants 
were asked to use their "intuition" to interpret the 
diagrams and to rate them using the same 8-point scale as 
described above. Participants also were asked to respond 
quickly, following their "first intuitive thought." and they 
received no feedback concerning the accuracy of their 
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ratings. The ratings and response latencies1 were recorded 
by the computer. 
After the experiment, participants completed a post-
experimental questionnaire regarding their observations and 
reflections pertaining to the stimulus material and the 
strategies used (if any) to make the ratings during the 
testing phase (see Appendix A for the questions used) . 
Following the post-experimental questions, respondents 
filled out the BDI, DAS, ABS, and DBS questionnaires. 
Finally, participants were debriefed and allowed to ask 
questions about the experiment. 
1Lewicki et al. (1989) expected participants to 
respond faster during the second half of the testing phase. 
Indeed, they found this to be the case. However, they 
explained this finding as a possible effect of ~unspecific 
training" (p. 328). The present study also found 
participants to respond significantly faster during the 
second half of the testing phase. A significant (Q < .0001) 
main effect of segment (i.e., trials 1-40 vs. trials 41-80) 
was found for latencies for both achievement and dependent 
groups. Contrary to our findings, these investigators also 
found that participants responded faster when rating 
"intelligent" brains as opposed to "nonintelligent'' brains. 
Whether this finding is due to a nonconscious 
differentiation of the two types of brains or due to a 
conscious response bias (in which favorable ratings are made 




Personality subtypes. Table 1 displays descriptive 
statistics of the scores for the entire sample on the ABS, 
DBS, DAS (achievement and dependency subscales) , and BDI 
questionnaires. The means for the measures are, overall, 
relatively low, indicating that the sample did not report a 
substantial number of depressive symptoms or personality 
characteristics associated with achievement and dependency 
concerns, as assessed by the measures used. Table 2 
presents the correlations between the measures used. The 
results indicate that the achievement measures appear to be 
more highly correlated (r = .718) than the dependency 
measures (r = .419), indicating more convergent validity for 
the achievement measures than for the dependency measures. 
However, the results also highlight the intercorrelations 
among measures of dependency and achievement concerns. For 
example, the highest correlation between achievement and 
dependency measures was found between the ABS and the 
dependency subscale of the DAS (r = .486). 
The present study was designed to examine four 
personality subtypes (i.e., dependent, achievement, 
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Table 1 
Mean, Standard Deviation, and Median Scores for Entire 
Sample of Measures of Personality Characteristics and 
Depression 
Measure M SD Median 
ABS 1.515 0.781 1. 429 
DBS 1.691 0.681 1.750 
BDI 7.534 6.160 7.000 
DAS-D 3.688 0.928 3.700 
DAS-Ac 2.566 0.914 2.333 
Note. N = 146. ABS =Achievement Beliefs Scale 
(average score; scale endpoints: 1 = ~Disagree very 
much," 4 ="Agree very much"); DBS= Dependency 
Beliefs Scale (average score; scale endpoints: 1 = 
"Disagree very much," 4 = "Agree very much") ; BDI 
Beck Depression Inventory (total score; range = O 
to 63); DAS-D = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, 
Dependency subscale (average score; scale 
endpoints: 1 = "Totally disagree," 7 = "Totally 
agree"); DAS-Ac = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scaler 
Achievement subscale (average score; scale 





Correlation Matrix of Measures of Personality and DeQression 
Measure ABS DAS-Ac DBS DAS-D BDI 
ABS 1.000 
DAS-Ac 0.718 1.000 
DBS 0.341 0.383 1.000 
DAS-D 0.486 0.451 0.419 l.000 
BDI 0.353 0.436 0.370 0.439 1.000 
Note. ABS = Achievement Beliefs Scale; DBS = Dependency 
Beliefs Scale; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; DAS-D = 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Dependency subscale; DAS-Ac 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Achievement subscale. 
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dependent and achievement, and neither dependent nor 
achievement) . Participants with characteristics of both 
personality subtypes were expected to be equally accurate in 
response to judgments involving achievement or dependency 
situations, while participants not possessing 
characteristics of either personality subtype were not 
expected to show sensitivity to either covariation. 
A dual criterion was used to classify participants as 
to the presence or absence of achievement and dependency 
characteristics. Participants' scores were required to fall 
above the median for both the ABS and DAS-Achievement 
measures in order to be classified as having achievement 
concerns. Similarly, participants' scores were required to 
fall above the median for both the DBS and DAS-Dependency 
measures in order to be categorized as having dependency 
concerns. Correspondingly, participants' scores were 
required to fall below the median on both achievement or 
both dependency measures in order to be assigned to the low 
achievement or low dependency groups, respectively. 
However, there were not enough participants per cell in each 
group to consider four separate personality subtypes as a 
result of the dual (more restrictive) criterion used (see 
Table 3 for sample sizes and Table 4 for descriptive 
statistics) . Twenty-three participants were found to have 
low scores on both characteristics (achievement 1 
dependency) , while 11 participants were found to have high 
Table 3 
Sample Sizes for Personality Subtypes 
Achievement 
Dependency Low High 
Low 23 7 
High 3 ll 





Sample Size, Mean, Standard Deviation, and Median Scores of 
Measures of Personality and Depression by Personality 
Subgroup 
Subgroup n M SD Median 
Low Achievement/ 
Low Dependency 23 
ABS 0.789 0.420 0.714 
DBS 0.929 0.378 1.000 
BDI 2.826 2.498 2.000 
DAS-D 2.696 0.581 2.700 
DAS-Ac 1.612 0.343 1.600 
Low Achievement/ 
High Dependency 3 
ABS 1.095 0.360 1.413 
DBS 1.958 0.072 2.000 
BDI 2.667 3.786 1.000 
DAS-D 4.000 0.436 3.800 
DAS-Ac 1.778 0.567 2.000 
High Achievement/ 
Low Dependency 7 
ABS 2.000 0.369 2.143 
DBS 0.786 0. 3 93 0.875 
BDI 3.429 2. 992 3.000 
DAS-D 2.857 0.648 2.900 
DAS-Ac 2.692 0.700 2.667 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Subgroup n M SD Median 
High Achievement/ 
High Dependency 11 
ABS 2.247 0.737 2.143 
DBS 2.227 0.457 2.125 
BDI 6.000 2.236 7.000 
DAS-D 4.573 0.454 4.800 
DAS-Ac 3.673 0.941 3.200 
Note. ABS = Achievement Beliefs Scale (average score; scale 
endpoints: 1 = "Disagree very much," 4 = "Agree very much"); 
DBS = Dependency Beliefs Scale (average score; scale 
endpoints: 1 ="Disagree very much, 11 4 = "Agree very much"); 
BDI = Beck Depression Inventory (total score; range = O to 
63); DAS-D = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Dependency 
subscale (average score; scale endpoints: l = "Totally 
disagree," 7 ="Totally agree"); DAS-Ac= Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale, Achievement subscale (average score; scale 
endpoints: 1 = "Totally disagree, " 7 = "Totally agree") . 
scores on both characteristics. Regarding high 
dependency/low achievement and low dependency/high 
achievement subtypes, only 3 and 7 participants, 
respectively, were placed into each group. 
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Because of the inadequate cell sizes, the analyses 
conducted examined two subgroups (high, low) for each 
personality subtype (achievement, dependency): participants 
who scored high (or low) on achievement concerns (i.e., on 
both the ABS and the achievement subscale of the DAS) 
regardless of their scores on dependency concerns and 
participants who scored high (or low) on dependency measures 
(i.e., on both the DBS and the dependency subscale of the 
DAS) regardless of their scores on achievement subscales. 
Tables 5 and 6 present descriptive statistics for the 
achievement and dependent subgroups, respectively, included 
in the analyses. In order to test the vulnerability 
hypothesis, participants with BDI scores above 9 were 
excluded from the personality subgroups. Thus, we examined 
participants' ratings of the stimuli as a function of their 
personality vulnerability, independent of current depressed 
mood state. 
Depressed and nondepressed groups. In order to test 
the state-dependent model, regardless of scores on 
achievement and dependency measures, participants who scored 
14 or above on the BDI were assigned to the depressed group 
(N = 24) and individuals who scored less than 10 were 
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Table 5 
Sample Characteristics (Mean, Standard Deviation, Median) of 
Achievement Subgroups Used in Statistical Anal~ses 
Subgroup M SD Median 
ABS 
Low Achievement 0.839 0.395 0.857 
High Achievement 2.182 0.556 2.143 
DBS 
Low Achievement 1.354 0.616 l.250 
High Achievement 1.728 0.727 l.875 
BDI 
Low Achievement 3.542 2.775 3.000 
High Achievement 5.034 2.809 5.000 
DAS-D 
Low Achievement 3.148 0.767 3.150 
High Achievement 3.745 0.870 3.800 
DAS-Ac 
Low Achievement 1.739 0.368 1.733 
High Achievement 3.308 0.764 3.067 
Note. Low Achievement, N = 48; High Achievement, N = 29. 
ABS = Achievement Beliefs Scale (average score; scale 
endpoints: 1 ="Disagree very much," 4 ="Agree very much"); 
DBS = Dependency Beliefs Scale (average score; scale 
endpoints: 1 = "Disagree very much," 4 ="Agree very much"); 
BDI = Beck Depression Inventory (total score; range = O to 
63); DAS-D = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Dependency 
subscale (average score; scale endpoints: 1 = "Totally 
disagree," 7 ="Totally agree"); DAS-Ac= Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale, Achievement subscale (average score; scale 
endpoints: 1 = "Totally disagree," 7 = "Totally agree") . 
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Table 6 
Sample Characteristics (Mean, Standard Deviation, Median) of 
Dependent Subgrou:gs Used in Statistical Analyses 
Subgroup l'1 SD Median 
ABS 
Low Dependency 1. 034 0.651 l.000 
High Dependency 1. 857 0.694 l.714 
DBS 
Low Dependency 0.882 0.401 l.000 
High Dependency 2.250 0.448 2.063 
BDI 
Low Dependency 3.324 2.825 3.000 
High Dependency 5.682 2.901 7.000 
DAS-D 
Low Dependency 2.685 0.598 2.700 
High Dependency 4.368 0.474 4.350 
DAS-Ac 
Low Dependency 1. 978 0.729 1.800 
High Dependency 2.921 l.077 2.867 
Note. Low Dependency, N = 34; High Dependency, N = 22. 
ABS = Achievement Beliefs Scale (average score; scale 
endpoints: 1 ="Disagree very much," 4 ="Agree very much"); 
DBS = Dependency Beliefs Scale (average score; scale 
endpoints: 1 = "Disagree very much," 4 ="Agree very much"); 
BDI = Beck Depression Inventory (total score; range = O to 
63); DAS-D = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Dependency 
subscale (average score; scale endpoints: 1 = vTotally 
disagree," 7 ="Totally agree"); DAS-Ac= Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale, Achievement subscale (average score; scale 
endpoints: 1 = "Totally disagree," 7 = "Totally agree") . 
designated as not depressed (N = 101), following Beck et 
al.'s (1988) criteria for classifying at least moderate 
depression. Table 7 displays means, medians, and standard 
deviations for depressed and nondepressed participants' 
scores on the BDI, ABS, DBS, and DAS subscales. 
Assessment of Conscious and Nonconscious Processing 
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Participants' conscious encoding was determined by 
their ability to report the nature of the covariation 
information they used to make ratings in the testing phase 
of the study. Thus, participants who became consciously 
aware of the covariation between the correct ASCII character 
and the situation presented with the brain diagrams during 
the learning phase were expected to explicitly identify, in 
the post-experimental questionnaire, the use of the critical 
character as part of their strategy for rating brain 
diagrams. Additionally, conscious awareness of the 
covariation would be demonstrated by a high degree of 
accuracy in participants' ratings during the testing phase. 
Nonconscious encoding was measured by examining the 
accuracy of participants' ratings (i.e., ratings between 1 
and 4 for brain diagrams reflecting few friends or low GPA, 
and ratings between 5 and 8 for brain diagrams reflecting 
many friends or high GPA) and the accuracy of participants' 
(conscious) answers on the post-experimental questionnaire. 
Thus, nonconscious encoding was presumed to take place when 
participants' ratings were accurate (or ~correct'' given the 
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Table 7 
Mean, Standard Deviation, and Median Scores of Depressed and 
Nondegressed Grougs 
Group n M SD Median 
Nondepressed 101 
ABS 1. 338 0.744 1.286 
DBS 1.556 0.697 1.625 
BDI 4.208 2.971 4.000 
DAS-D 3.420 0.849 3.400 
DAS-Ac 2.344 0.859 2.200 
Depressed 24 
ABS 2.024 0.737 2.143 
DBS 2.057 0.454 2.125 
BDI 18.250 4.316 17.500 
DAS-D 4.325 0.813 4.350 
DAS-Ac 3.278 0.837 3.233 
Note. BDI total < 10 = Nondepressed; BDI total ~ 14 = 
Depressed. ABS = Achievement Beliefs Scale (average score; 
scale endpoints: 1 ="Disagree very much," 4 = 11 Agree very 
much"); DBS = Dependency Beliefs Scale (average score; 
endpoints: 1 ="Disagree very much," 4 = "Agree very much"); 
BDI = Beck Depression Inventory (total scorei range = O to 
63); DAS-D = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Dependency 
subscale (average score; scale endpoints: l = "Totally 
disagree," 7 ="Totally agree"); DAS-Ac= Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale, Achievement subscale (average score; scale 
endpoints: 1 = "Totally disagree," 7 = 11 Totally agree"). 
learned encoding rule) but participants were unable to 
articulate the nature of the covariation following the 
experimental procedure. 
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Following the data analysis procedures established by 
Lewicki et al. (1989), the rating scale was dichotomized (1-
4 and 5-8) as "correct" or ''incorrect" (depending on the 
covariation condition) when determining participants' 
''accuracy" in each segment, in order to control for 
intrasubject response bias (i.e., being more likely to 
assign high ratings than low ones) . The dichotomized scale 
was used for the analyses that examined the accuracy of 
conscious and nonconscious processing, while the whole 
rating scale was used for the analyses that examined 
participants' ratings. Also following the procedures 
established by Lewicki et al. (1989), the BO ratings 
presented to each participant during the testing phase were 
divided into two consecutive segments of 40 trials each. 
Based on the self-perpetuation hypothesis, participants' 
ratings were expected, on average, to be more consistent 
with the covariation during the second segment than on the 
first. 
Analyses for Counterbalanced Variable: Type of Brain Diagram 
As stated above, the type of brain diagram (4% and 17%) 
was counterbalanced with the high or low endpoints of the 
congruency situation in a between-subject design. Thus, 
brains with 4% of the critical character were paired with 
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either the low endpoint of the situation (i.e., low GPA or 
very few friends), thus requiring a low rating between 1 and 
4, or the high endpoint (i.e., high GPA or many friends), 
thus requiring a high rating between 5 and 8) . 
Correspondingly, brains with 17% of the critical character 
were paired with either the high or the low endpoints of the 
congruency situation, also requiring high or low ratings, 
respectively. 
In order to compare counterbalancing conditions, ~­
tests were performed. Therefore, conditions 1 (17% high 
GPA, 4% low GPA) and 2 (4% high GPA, 17% low GPA) were 
compared on several dependent variables (scores on ABS, DBS, 
BDI, DAS, ratings, response latencies, responses to the 
post-experimental questionnaire, and gender). Similarly, 
conditions 3 (17% many friends, 4% very few friends) and 4 
(4% many friends, 17% very few friends) were compared on the 
same dependent variables. No systematic differences were 
expected. In fact, the groups were found not to differ 
across several dependent variables, suggesting that it was 
appropriate to collapse across the counterbalancing 
variables (i.e., covariation direction) for the remaining 
analyses. However, there were three comparisons that 
yielded statistically significant differences between 
groups. Participants in conditions 1 and 2 were found to 
differ on gender, ~(72) = 2.216, £ < .05 (i.e., more females 
than males in condition 2) and on one item from the post-
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experimental questionnaire dealing with a particular but 
noncritical ASCII character. Participants in condition 1 
were more likely to indicate that they used the blank space 
to distinguish the brain diagrams than individuals in 
condition 2, ~(72) = 2.158, p < .05. Regarding conditions 3 
and 4, participants were only found to differ on their 
ratings for brain diagrams requiring high ratings (5-8) 
during the second segment of the testing phase. Namely, 
participants in condition 3 made higher ratings than the 
individuals in condition 4, ~(70) = -2.100, £ < .05. It is 
difficult to interpret why these results would occur, and 
these significant differences were not expected to impact 
the general interpretations of the results. 
Analyses for the Congruency and Self-Perpetuation Hypotheses 
Nonconscious processing using participants' ratings as 
the dependent variable. In order to test the congruency 
hypothesis, an interaction was expected between 
participants' personality subtype, the situation to be rated 
(GPA, friends), and the direction of rating (high, low) . 
Thus, participants' accuracy of judgments for GPA or number 
of friends was expected to differ depending on the 
personality subtype. Based on the congruency hypothesis, it 
was expected that the judgments of individuals with 
achievement and dependent personality subtypes would be more 
consistent, or accurate, with the learned covariations when 
the ratings involved the GPA or the friends conditions, 
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respectively. In addition, based on the self-perpetuation 
hypothesis, it was expected that participants' judgments 
during the testing phase would gradually become more 
consistent with the covariation "learned" in the first phase 
of the study (i.e., participants' ratings would be more 
accurate during the second segment of the testing phase) . 
Support for the congruency hypothesis would be observed 
in a three-way interaction involving personality subtype, 
situation to be rated, and direction of rating. Therefore, 
a 2 (personality subtype: high or low) x 2 (situation to be 
rated: GPA or friends) x 2 (direction of ratings: low or 
high) ANOVA was calculated for each personality group 
(achievement or dependent) , with repeated measures on the 
last factor. The direction variable is repeated because all 
participants were exposed to brain diagrams with low GPA 
(very few friends) and a high GPA (many friends) . Support 
for the self-perpetuation hypothesis would be obtained by a 
2 x 2 interaction involving the direction of ratings (low, 
high) and the segment (first 40 trials, second 40 trials) 
variables. If the congruency effect requires many trials to 
develop (as in self-perpetuation of encoding biases), then a 
significant four-way interaction would be expected. Recall 
that participants who scored 10 or above on the BDI were 
excluded from the analyses. Thus, individuals in the 
personality groups were not depressed at the time of the 
study, but were classified according to the presence of a 
vulnerability to depression based on dependency or 
achievement concerns. 
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Regarding the self-perpetuation hypothesis, the results 
indicate that the direction of rating x segment interaction 
was not significant: f(l, 100) = 1.673, Q = .199. 
Therefore, participants did not become more accurate in 
rating the brain diagrams during the second segment of the 
testing phase. 
Results also indicate that no evidence was found for 
the congruency hypothesis. The 2 x 2 x 2 (Personality 
Subtype [High, Low] x Situation [GPA, Friends] x Direction 
of Rating [Low, High]) ANOVA for participants' ratings 
yielded a non-significant interaction for the dependent 
personality group: f(l, 52) = 1.345, 2 = .252. Similarly, 
when the achievement group was used for the analysis, no 
interaction was observed, f(l, 73) = .010, ~ = .922. 
However, participants did correctly rate "low GPA/very few 
friends" brains lower (i.e., brains diagrams received 
ratings less than 5) than "high GPA/many friends 11 brains 
(i.e., brains diagrams received ratings greater than 5). 
Thus, a main effect for type of rating was found E(l, 52) 
24.308, 2 < .0001 (when dependent subtypes were formed) and 
f(l, 73) = 20.954, 2 < .0001 (when achievement subtypes were 
formed). When dependent groups were formed, the mean rating 
for the brain diagrams with the positive endpoint (high GPA, 
many friends) was 5.314, and the mean rating for low-
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endpoint brain diagrams was 4.083. Similarly, when 
achievement groups were formed, the mean ratings for the 
diagrams with the positive and negative endpoints were 5.208 
and 4.302, respectively. In sum, these results suggest that 
participants' ratings were accurate. The fact that 
participants' accuracy did not interact with either 
personality variable indicates that participants did not 
make correct ratings on the basis of personality subtype 
(i.e., high or low achievement/dependency). Furthermore, 
the situation that participants rated (GPA, friends) did not 
influence whether they correctly judged the brain diagrams. 
In order to determine whether the congruency effect 
requires many trials to develop (as in self-perpetuation of 
encoding biases), the four-way interaction was calculated. 
The 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (Personality Subtype [High, Low] x 
Situation [GPA, Friends] x Direction of Rating [Low, High] x 
Segment [First, Second]) ANOVA for participants' ratings 
yielded a non-significant interaction for the dependent 
personality group: E(l, 52) = 0.823, ~ = .368. Similarly, 
when the achievement group was used for the analysis, no 
interaction was observed, E(l, 73) = 3.287, £ = .074. Thus, 
the findings did not provide evidence that the congruency 
effect may require many trials to develop. 
Nonconscious processing using accuracy of participants' 
judgments as the dependent variable. Nonconscious encoding 
was presumed to take place when participants' ratings were 
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accurate, given the learned encoding rule, but participants 
were unable to articulate the nature of the covariation 
(when answering the post-experimental questionnaire) . Thus, 
the congruency hypothesis was also tested by classifying 
participants' judgments as "correct" or "incorrect" based on 
their mean ratings falling within the 1-4 or 5-8 range, as 
appropriate. For the dependent personality group, no 
evidence of nonconscious encoding was found as a function of 
personality subtype (high or low) and situation to be rated 
(GPA, friends), X2 (1, N = 52) = .103, p = .748. Results for 
the congruency interaction were non-significant for the 
achievement group as well, X2 (1, N = 73) .527, p = .468. 
Conscious processing as a function of personality 
vulnerability. As explained above, conscious encoding was 
determined by participants' ability to report the nature of 
the covariation information they used to make ratings in the 
testing phase of the study. This information was expected 
to be reported on the post-experimental questionnaire. In 
addition, conscious awareness of the covariation would be 
demonstrated by a high degree of accuracy in participants' 
ratings during the testing phase. To test conscious 
processing, the dependent variable was classified according 
to "correct" and "incorrect" categories based on whether 
participants correctly identified the covariation. 
Personality subtypes, as defined by the ABS, DBS, and 
DAS subscales did not appear to influence participants' 
47 
ability to detect consciously the covariation between the 
percentage of the critical character and the situation (GPA, 
friends) . The main effect of personality was not 
significant for the dependent group, K2 (1, N = 42) 2.10, 2 
= .147. Similarly, a nonsignificant main effect of 
personality was found for the achievement group, K2 (1, N = 
59) = .038, 2 = .846. No overall effect of situation to be 
rated (GPA, friends) was found either, K2 (1, N = 114) 
.073, 2 = .787. Regarding the congruency hypothesis, no 
evidence of conscious encoding was found for the dependent 
personality group as a function of personality subtype (high 
or low) and situation to be rated (GPA or friends): X2 (1, N 
= 42) = .718, 2 = .397. Similarly, no evidence of conscious 
encoding was found as a function of personality subtype and 
situation for the achievement personality group, K2 (1, N = 
59) = 1.039, 2 = .308. 
State-Dependent Information Processing 
Nonconscious processing using participants' ratings as 
the dependent variable. The preceding results indicate that 
the congruency hypothesis was not supported. Based on this 
hypothesis, it was predicted that nondepressed participants 
who were classified according to their vulnerability to 
depression based on achievement and dependent personality 
characteristics would learn the covariations for GPA and 
friends, respectively. However, no effect of these 
variables was observed for conscious or nonconscious 
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processing of the covariation information. 
An alternative hypothesis is that nonconscious and 
conscious encoding of covariation information is influenced 
by depressed mood state rather than vulnerability to 
depression. To test this hypothesis, participants were 
classified as depressed if they scored 14 or higher on the 
BDI (N = 24) and nondepressed if they scored 9 or below (N 
101) 
In support of a state-dependent processing model, level 
of depression (high, low) and direction of rating (1-4, 5-8) 
were expected to influence participants' ratings. Low 
ratings (between 1 and 4) were always paired with the 
negative endpoint of the situation to be rated (very few 
friends, low GPA). Similarly, high ratings (between 5 and 
8) were always paired with the positive endpoint of the 
situation to be rated (many friends, high GPA). Therefore, 
to the extent that information-processing is state-dependent 
(i.e., during depression) and not a function of personality 
vulnerability, it was predicted that depressed individuals 
would be more accurate in their ratings when ratings 
involved negative content, while nondepressed individuals 
were expected to be more accurate in their ratings when 
ratings involved positive content. The main effect for 
level of depression was found to be nonsignificant, f (l, 
123) = .168, ~ = .683. However, the main effect for 
direction of rating yielded a significant result, £(1, 123) 
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= 7.161, 2 < .01. The findings indicate that participants 
were accurate in assigning high or low ratings to brain 
diagrams as appropriate, but the level of depression had no 
overall effect on the accuracy of participants' performance. 
There was, however, a significant interaction between 
level of depression and direction of rating, £(1, 123) = 
6.842, 2 = .01. Contrary to the state-dependent prediction, 
depressed individuals did not differentiate nonconsciously 
between the two types of brain diagrams. Their ratings 
indicate that they were inaccurate, as they rated each type 
of brain equivalently (M = 4.77 for positive endpoint 
diagrams and M = 4.76 for negative endpoint diagrams). In 
contrast, nondepressed individuals accurately rated the two 
types of brain diagrams (M = 5.18 for positive endpoint 
diagrams and M = 4.27 for negative endpoint diagrams). 
Thus, it appears that only nondepressed participants were 
able to identify the covariation in the brain diagrams at a 
nonconscious level. 
If self-perpetuation of the encoding rule develops over 
trials, then the segment variable should enter into a 
significant interaction with level of depression and 
direction of the ratings. Thus, a 2 (level of depression: 
high, low) x 2 (direction of ratings: 1-4, 5-8) x 2 
(segment: first, second) A.NOVA was calculated with repeated 
measures on the last two factors. Results indicate that the 
interaction was not significant: E(l, 123) = 1.417, Q = 
.236. Overall, these findings provide no evidence for the 
hypothesis that negative encoding biases may be a 
consequence of depressive symptoms (state-dependent model) 
or for the hypothesis that these biases may develop over 
time. 
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Nonconscious processing using accuracy of participants' 
judgments as dependent variable. Nonconscious processing in 
the depressed and nondepressed groups (regardless of 
personality subtype) was also examined by using a 
dichotomous classification of participants' ratings as 
correct or incorrect based on their mean ratings falling 
within the 1-4 or 5-8 range, as appropriate (39.4% of 
nondepressed participants were correct in their ratings, 
while 50% of depressed participants were correct in their 
ratings). As with the personality groups, nonconscious 
encoding was presumed to take place when participants' 
ratings were accurate, given the learned encoding rule, but 
participants were unable to articulate the nature of the 
covariation (in answering the post-experimental 
questionnaire) . No evidence was found for nonconscious 
encoding as a function of level of depression, X2 (1, N = 
123) = .863, 2 = .353. 
Conscious processing as a function of level of 
depression. As described above, conscious encoding was 
determined by participants' ability to report the nature of 
the covariation information used to make ratings in the 
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testing phase of the study. In addition, conscious 
awareness of the covariation would be demonstrated by a high 
degree of accuracy in participants' ratings during the 
testing phase. Once again, the dependent variable was 
classified according to ''correct" and "incorrect" categories 
based on whether participants correctly identified the 
covariation or were incorrect in their identification (17.3% 
of nondepressed participants correctly identified the 
covariation, while 4.8% of the depressed participants were 
correct in their identification of the covariation) . 
Level of depression, as assessed by the BDI, did not 
appear to influence participants' ability to detect 
consciously the covariation between the percentage of the 
critical character and the situation (GPA, friends) . No 
evidence of conscious encoding was found for the depression 
subgroups as a function of level of depression (high or 
low), K2 (1, N = 102) = 2.085, £ = .149. 
CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the present study was to provide a 
possible explanation for the cognitive origins of negative 
encoding biases, including their relation to individuals' 
personality characteristics, and their dependence on, or 
independence from, depressed mood. However, the present 
study found no support for the development of encoding 
biases, either at a conscious or nonconscious level, as a 
function of vulnerability to stressors based on achievement 
and dependent personality characteristics. Furthermore, the 
present study found no evidence for the development of 
encoding biases, either consciously or nonconsciously, as a 
function of depressed mood state. 
An additional purpose consisted of partially 
replicating Lewicki et al.'s (1989) findings on the self-
perpetuating development of encoding biases. These findings 
were not replicated in the present study. Nondepressed 
participants did, however, make correct judgments at a 
nonconscious level regarding the covariations across all 
trials. Thus, in the present study, these participants 
seemed to accurately rate the brain diagrams throughout the 
entire testing phase, and did not require trials for the 
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encoding bias to develop over time. A possible explanation 
for the lack of evidence regarding self-perpetuation is that 
the difference between the percentages of the critical 
character used in the present study (17% and 4%) may have 
been more salient to participants than the difference 
between 17% and 13% used by Lewicki et al. (1989). Thus, 
the encoding bias in the present study may not have required 
trials to develop over time. 
Some problematic methodological and conceptual issues 
may have influenced the results. In broad terms, they 
relate to problems with the present study and problems with 
encoding studies in general. Four main issues will be 
addressed in the following discussion. First, the measures 
used in the present study to classify participants as having 
dependency or achievement concerns may not have accurately 
captured distinct characteristics of the personality 
subtypes. Second, the manipulation in the present study 
involving GPA and number of friends may not have adequately 
primed the personality vulnerability. Third, some aspects 
of Lewicki et al.'s (1989) findings may be questionable, in 
particular, the accuracy of participants' ratings and the 
clinical significance of the study's findings. Last, not 
only may encoding effects be difficult to achieve but the 
congruency effect may also be found at a different step in 
the processing of information. 
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Construct Validity of the Measures 
The personality measures used in the present study may 
not have validly assessed dependency and achievement 
concerns. Furthermore, the two subtypes may not be distinct 
and mutually exclusive personality characteristics (Coyne & 
Whiffen, 1995) . Regarding the divergent validity of the 
measures, the dependency and achievement subscales of the 
DAS, for example, were found to be considerably correlated 
(~ = .541). That dependency and achievement concerns are 
related is promoted by Coyne and Whiffen (1995), who review 
findings that consider the possibility of autonomy (i.e., 
achievement) and dependency concerns as potential dimensions 
of personality occurring within the same individual, rather 
than as independent traits. Thus, it may be inappropriate 
to differentiate dependent and achievement types, and 
instead, researchers should determine individuals' relative 
position on these dimensions. Due to small cell sizes, the 
present study was unable to compare participants according 
to their relative position on the dependency and achievement 
dimensions (i.e., high achievement/high dependency, high 
achievement/low dependency, low achievement/high dependency, 
low achievement/low dependency) . Instead, the present study 
classified participants according to their scores (high or 
low) on the dependent (or achievement) characteristic, 
regardless of their score on the other personality 
dimension. 
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In terms of the criteria used for the classification of 
personality subtypes, the low convergent validity between 
the DBS and the dependency subscale of the DAS <x = .419) 
may have affected the utility of using a dual criterion. In 
addition, median splits were used to classify participants' 
scores into high or low groups. Coyne and Whiffen (1995) 
point out that the use of this technique creates an 
arbitrary cutpoint that does not change the continuous 
nature of the variable in question. They also point out 
that individuals who score above the cutpoint are typically 
treated as identical, regardless of the difference in their 
scores, while individuals who are close in scores but on 
opposite sides of the cutpoint are treated as different. 
Therefore, other classification techniques may be adopted by 
future studies to account for the continuous nature of the 
personality variables in question. 
Stress and Activation of Vulnerability 
Another problematic conceptual issue related to the 
personality measures used in the present study was 
highlighted by Coyne and Whiffen (1995) . After reviewing 
the research on the congruency hypothesis, Coyne and Whiffen 
(1995) suggest that serious life stress and stable 
contextual factors may affect the validity of measures that 
intend to assess stable personality traits. They propose 
that measures of dependency and achievement concerns may 
reflect stable, trait-like characteristics, as well as the 
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effect of stressful life circumstances and other situational 
factors present at the time of measurement (Coyne & Whiffen, 
1995) . Thus, future studies of personality vulnerability 
would benefit from the additional assessment of current life 
stress. 
Regarding the activation of the vulnerability, the 
particular situations used in the present study (GPA, number 
of friends) may not have been stressful enough to prime the 
achievement and dependency personality subtypes. Thus, 
future studies may test the vulnerability hypothesis by 
manipulating a stressful event, such as an achievement or 
interpersonal failure, and then test the nonconscious or 
conscious processing that may contribute to the aevelopment 
of encoding biases. 
Findings by Lewicki's Group 
A possible problem related to the findings in the 
present study concerns previous research conducted in this 
area. Lewicki et al.'s (1989) findings, while statistically 
significant, may have little clinical significance. The 
differences found in accuracy of participants' ratings were 
small. The largest difference in ratings for ''intelligent" 
and "nonintelligent" brain diagrams occurrea during the 
second segment of trials. Specifically, Lewicki et al. 
(1989) found mean ratings to fall around 4.81 (for 
nonintelligent brain diagrams) and around 4.97 (for 
intelligent brains diagrams). Thus, given the small 
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magnitude of the difference in mean ratings, these findings 
may be difficult to replicate. 
It should also be noted that the average ratings 
reported by Lewicki et al. (1989) are below 5 1 even for 
brain diagrams that required correct ratings between 5 and 8 
(i.e. , those diagrams labelled as "intelligent 11 ) • This 
finding suggests that, contrary to Lewicki's et al.'s (1989) 
conclusions, participants did not learn the covariation 
between the intelligence condition and the critical 
character in the brain diagrams. The present study found 
that participants did learn the encoding rule presented in 
the learning phase; however, this learning appears to have 
occurred independently of personality characteristics. In 
terms of the depressed and nondepressed distinction, only 
nondepressed participants appeared to have learned the 
encoding rule. 
Encoding Effects 
Another possible explanation for the results found in 
the present study relates to general problems of encoding 
studies. Gotlib, McLachlan, and Katz (1988) suggest that 
the congruency effect may not be found at encoding, but at a 
different step in the processing of information. The 
present study hypothesized that, if the development of 
negative encoding biases depends on depressed mood state, 
participants would be more accurate in rating brain diagrams 
paired with negative situations (low GPA 1 very few friends) 
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than diagrams paired with positive situations (high GPA, 
many friends). Gotlib et al. (1988) found that, contrary to 
predictions, depressed participants did not attend to 
negative stimuli more frequently than to positive or neutral 
stimuli. In attempting to explain the obtained results, 
Gotlib et al. (1988) suggested that negative biases may be 
found in later stages of processing (i.e., recall) rather 
than in earlier ones (i.e., attention). The same 
explanation may be applied to the findings in the present 
study. 
Gotlib et al. (1988) offered an additional suggestion 
for their findings, explaining the results according to a 
model of attention referred to as 11 zoom lens 11 (Ericksen & 
Yeh, 1985; cited in Gotlib et al., 1988). This model states 
that attention can be thought of as a zoom camera. Assuming 
that attention is allocated along a dimension, attention may 
be deployed widely, at a cost in resolution, or narrowly, 
with high resolution. In applying this model to their data, 
Gotlib et al. (1988) suggest that depressed participants may 
have deployed attention widely at a cost in resolution, 
while nondepressed participants may have focused their 
attention more narrowly, with better resolution. Similarly, 
the zoom lens model may explain why nondepressed 
participants in the present study were able to learn the 
covariation while depressed participants, who may have 
attended to a wider range of stimuli, were not able to do 
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so. 
The results of the present study indicate that 
individuals with moderate depressed symptoms did not learn 
the covariation, while nondepressed individuals did appear 
to learn the covariation. It is also possible that the 
ability to learn covariation information from the 
environment may be a deficit in depression (i.e., depressed 
individuals may lose the ability to attend to, process, or 
remember information) . Furthermore, this deficit may be due 
to cognitive or motivational factors. However, this 
question cannot be determined with the data in the present 
study. 
In conclusion, the present study, while limited, 
attempted to contribute to the research examining the role 
of cognitive factors in depression, as well as the research 
investigating the association between personality 
characteristics and particular stressors. Contrary to the 
state-dependent model, depressed individuals were less 
likely to encode a covariation rule regarding particular 
events. Instead, depressed individuals were unable to learn 
the covariation in the stimuli, suggesting that, rather than 
possessing a nonconscious sensitivity to negative 
information, these individuals were insensitive to the 
subtle covariations in the stimuli. This apparent lack of 
sensitivity appears consistent with the wide lens/low 
resolution concept described by the zoom lens model. 
APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS AND POST-EXPERIMENTAL 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Instructions to Practice Phase 
(Instructions for the dependent situation were identical, 
except for the situation to be rated. Each participant was 
given a copy of the instructions. Once participants 
finished reading the instructions, the experimenter reviewed 
them orally.) 
This study is concerned with how people form intuitive 
impressions of digitized brain diagrams. During this 
experiment you will be shown brain diagrams such as the one 
attached [a copy of the diagram presented in Appendix B will 
be provided] . The first part of the study is a practice 
phase, and thus, we would like to familiarize you with the 
task. A personality characteristic will appear on the upper 
right hand corner of the screen along with each diagram that 
is presented, indicating whether the diagram reflects a 
person who has a high grade-point average (GPA) or a person 
who has a low GPA. 
Please look at the upper right hand corner of the screen 
first to see what kind of person is represented, and then 
look at the diagram. Examine the diagram and try to gain an 
intuitive feeling (a "gut feeling") for the person based on 
the personality characteristic and other information 
presented on the computer screen. The intuitive feelings 
you develop in this practice phase will be tested later. 
Because the computers are slow, it takes some time for the 
whole scan to appear on the screen. Some adjustments will 
occur on the brain diagrams (especially at the top) but 
these have nothing to do with the experiment. 
In order to familiarize you with the rating scale, please 
use the number keys labeled on the computer key board (1 
through 8) to indicate whether the brain diagram reflects a 
person who has a high or a low GPA. During these initial 
practice trials, you can be confident that when we tell you 
a person has a high GPA, you should give that person a 
rating of 5 through 8. A person with low GPA should receive 
a rating of 1 through 4. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Low GPA High GPA 
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IMPORTANT: Please be patient with the computer and wait for 
the next diagram to appear after you make a rating. You 
will see the phrase "Press any key to continue" after 
several brain diagrams have been presented. Please raise 
your hand at that point, before you proceed. 
Assessment of Comprehension of Instructions 
In order to make sure that everyone is using the 
instructions in the same way, we would like you to answer 
the following questions: 
1. This study is about 
(a) Intuition 
(b) Telepathy 
(c) Dream analysis 
2. The confidence scale has points. 
3. Please write in the characteristics that correspond to 
the endpoints of the scale. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
If you have any questions or if things are not clear, please 
ask the experimenter before you proceed. 
Please raise your hand when you are done. 
(Subjects will be instructed to begin the practice phase at 
this point.) 
Instructions to Testing Phase 
(To be given to participants at the end of the practice 
phase.) 
Now you will see some additional brain diagrams. This time 
we won't be providing you with any personality information 
about the person. Based on the personality information 
previously presented, we now would like you to rely on your 
intuition to rate whether the person has a high GPA or a low 
GPA. 
Please use the 8 keys labeled on the computer keyboard, 
which form an eight-point scale, to indicate whether the 
person has a high GPA or a low GPA. Your confidence in your 
intuition may vary. Ratings of 1 through 4 would reflect a 
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person who has a low GPA, while ratings of 5 through 8 would 
reflect a person who has a high GPA. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Low GPA High GPA 
You may not know why you are making a particular rating but 
that is how your intuitive feelings may work. Try to get a 
general feeling of whether the person has a high or low GPA 
by relying on your intuition (or "gut feeling~), and 
respond quickly, following your first intuitive thought. 
Additional Instructions on Personality Characteristics 
(GPA condition) 
People who have a high GPA 
-may be concerned with academic failure 
-tend to expect above-average performance 
-may avoid taking risks for fear of making mistakes 
-may be reluctant to ask for help 
People who have a low GPA 
-may not set high standards for themselves 
-often feel they can enjoy an activity regardless of the end 
result 
-may not necessarily feel inferior if they display weakness 
-generally are not upset when they make mistakes 
(Friends condition) 
People who have many friends 
-may find it difficult to be alone 
-are often good at avoiding any disagreements and conflicts 
with people 
-tend to be concerned with what others think about them 
-work hard to maintain relationships with people at all 
costs 
People who have very few friends 
-may feel that their own opinions of themselves are more 
important than others' opinions 
-often feel that they don't get enough love or respect from 
others as they deserve 
-may not necessarily rely on other people for support and 
encouragement 
-may prioritize their own needs and wants above those of 
others 
Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
(To be answered by participants at the end of the testing 
phase.) 
Please spend a few minutes answering the following 
questions. We are interested in your observations and 
impressions about the task you just completed. 
1) How did you go about making your ratings? 
2) Which particular aspects of the brain diagrams did you 
pay attention to? 
63 
(The first two questions will be on a separate sheet to 
prevent participants from being influenced by the questions 
that follow.) 
3) When you were making the ratings, did you consider any of 
the following as possibilities: (please circle YES or NO) 
a) YES NO the shape of the diagrams 
b) YES NO the size of the diagrams 
c) YES NO the x axis 
d) YES NO the y axis 
e) YES NO the shading 
f) YES NO the color of the screen 
g) YES NO a general/intuitive feeling 
If so, please explain. 
4) At any time, did you make your decision (your ratings) 
based on: (please circle YES or NO) 
a) YES NO the shape of the diagrams 
b) YES NO the size of the diagrams 
c) YES NO the x axis 
d) YES NO the y axis 
e) YES NO the shading 
f) YES NO the color of the screen 
g) YES NO a general/intuitive feeling 
If so, please explain. 
5) The brain diagrams were made up of particular symbols. 
Did you pay attention to any of the symbols to make your 
ratings? 
If so, circle which one(s) and explain how you used the 
symbol(s). 
a) I f) I 
b) II g) I 
c) "blank space" h) ~ 
d) i) I 
e) • j ) 
64 
6) When you were making your ratings, did you pay attention 
to the following areas of the brain diagrams: 
a) the left side 
b) the right side 
c) the middle 
d) the top 
e) the bottom 
If so, circle which one(s) and explain how you used the 
information. 
7) Did you try any other strategies to make your ratings? 
If so, please explain. 
8) Do you have any additional comments or observations about 
the brain diagrams or the procedure of the experiment? 
APPENDIX B 
SAMPLE OF COMPUTERIZED BRAIN DIAGRAM 
Note. Arrow indicates critical ASCII character. 
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